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INTRODUCTION 
• In general terms this paper is located in the context of persistent claims to 
connect copyright with creativity and so-called “cultural rights”/human 
rights of various types.  For this reason I want to start my presentation with 
some reflections on the relationship between copyright and cultural rights 
and then move on the specific case of festivals.  After which I hope to be 
able to raise some questions about the relationship between copyright, 
creativity and cultural rights. 
• I should emphasize that my aim at the moment is to raise questions rather 
than draw conclusions.  And the questions that I raise will inform the 
empirical study of various arts festivals, which I will be undertaking.   
 
CULTURAL RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
• In order to investigate the connection between human rights, rights to 
culture and intellectual property rights, I want to start by giving some flesh 
to the idea of cultural rights. 
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1. Is there a “right to culture”? 
International legal instruments 
• There are a number of UNESCO Conventions that bear directly on the 
question of “cultural rights”. 
 
• So we have, for example: 1. the Convention on the Prevention of the Illicit 
Movement of Cultural Property of 1970; 2. the World Heritage Convention 
of 1972; 3. the Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage of 2001; 4. the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage of 2003, which entered into force on 20 April 2006; and 5. 
the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, which entered into force on 18 March 2007.
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• Of course, it seems highly irregular to have mentioned the first three of 
these Conventions in the present context.  This is, perhaps, because the 
persistent connection between some types of cultural rights and 
intellectual property rights has tended to suggest that what might be 
described as “tangible culture” is an entirely different order of things to 
more intangible forms. 
 
• At least in the area of cultural heritage, this separation between the 
tangible and the intangible is problematic precisely because the thing that 
makes a tangible item a part of cultural heritage is its symbolic or intangible 
association. 
 
• For this and for other reasons, I think it is worth raising some questions 
about this tangible/intangible distinction when one is considering the 
relationship between cultural rights/property and intellectual property – 
and I’ll come back to this shortly.  Nevertheless, as a copyright scholar, I 
confess to being in thrall to the tangible/intangible distinction with the 
result that I am going to say more about the Convention on Intangible 
Cultural Heritage and the Convention on Cultural Diversity. 
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 There is also the Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, which entered into force on 2 
November 2001, but this Convention is not considered in this paper. 
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• However, in the context of an examination of where human rights start and 
end in this disputed territory and what their significance to it might be, I 
want, first, to say a little bit about the international legal background of 
these two UNESCO Conventions by talking a little bit about what the human 
rights conventions do in this area. 
 
• The human rights conventions with which I am particularly concerned are 
the Covenants to the UN Charter. 
 
• The provisions of these Covenants that may be argued to operate together 
in order to create a right to culture are Articles 1, 19, 27 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and Art 15 of the Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).  I’m not going to bore you, or myself, 
with a close textual analysis of these provisions. Rather, I will confine 
myself to the following observations on them: 
o When these provisions are analysed it can be seen that it is probably 
more appropriate to characterize their composite effect as creating, 
if anything, a right to cultural self-determination, which in turn 
suggests the valorization of cultural diversity. 
o As is not infrequently the case with provisions of this sort in 
international instruments, the exact ambit of the provisions in CCPR 
and CESCR are far from clear.  One example of this is the right in 
Article 15.1(a) “[t]o take part in cultural life”, which is obviously of 
some significance in the context of a right to cultural self-
determination.   
o Article 27 of CCPR and Article 15.1(c) of CESCR have attracted 
particular debate.  This is because it is frequently argued that these 
provisions support the characterisation of intellectual property rights 
as human rights.  Article 27 of CCPR is said to ground the grant of 
intellectual property rights to protect traditional and Indigenous 
cultural expressions and knowledge.  Article 15.1(c) of CESCR is said 
to ground intellectual property rights, in general, on a human rights 
basis.  A similar argument is frequently made with respect to the 
precursor of Article 15.1(c), Article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).  This is not surprising since CESCR, Article 
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15.1, is clearly based upon Article 27 of the UDHR.  It is evident that 
none of Article 27.2 of the UDHR, Article 15.1(c) of CESCR or Article 
27 of CCPR necessarily mandate intellectual property protection in 
the form in which it currently prevails.  It is also clear that whatever 
means are chosen to implement the rights contained in these 
Articles, those rights must be balanced against the other rights laid 
down in Articles 27 of the UDHR, Article 15 of the CESCR, and in the 
Covenants as a whole. 
 
 
 
• These somewhat diffuse and loose-fitting provisions of the UDHR, the CCPR 
and CESCR form the backdrop to the UNESCO Convention for the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
 
• It is evident from the Preambles and operative provisions of both 
Conventions that they firmly lodge themselves within the human rights 
camp, even if neither goes so far as to create a new human right.   
 
• This is particularly true in relation to the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which pushes the 
human rights envelope considerably further, and more floridly, than its 
older sibling,
2
 which is perhaps a consequence of the current obsession 
with the language of human rights.   
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 For an assessment of the relationship between the UNESCO Convention and existing international human rights 
obligations, see C Graber, “The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance to the WTO?” 
(2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 553, 560-563. 
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Relationship between the UNESCO Conventions, intellectual property rights, 
and the World Trade Organization Agreements 
 
• Neither UNESCO Convention has much to say about intellectual property 
rights.  Both have only a passing reference to it. 
 
• Neither suggests that these rights are critical to realizing their objectives, 
and only the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage appears to give any recognition to the potential of intellectual 
property rights to interfere with those objectives. 
 
• The absence of much in the way of references to intellectual property rights 
as a mode for the realization of Convention objectives is, at least, notable in 
relation to the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.  On the other hand, it seems particularly odd that the Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions is 
so little concerned with the negative effects of intellectual property rights.
3
 
 
• In fact, on the contrary, and from my point of view rather alarmingly, in 
April this year UNESCO “celebrated” the importance of copyright in 
preserving creativity on the “World Book and Copyright Day”, the day on 
which in 1616 Cervantes, Shakespeare and Inca Garcilaso de la Vega all 
                                                          
3
 Although it would be unwise to ignore the potential negative effects of intellectual property rights on the 
protection of intangible cultural heritage: see, eg, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS/290/R, 15/3/2005; see also M Blakeney, 
“Biotechnology, TRIPs and the Convention on Biological Diversity” (1998/1999) 4 Bioscience Law Review 144-50; M 
Blakeney, “Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmers’ Rights” [2002] 24 European Intellectual Property Review 9; G E 
Evans & M Blakeney, “The Protection of Geographical Indications after Doha: Quo Vadis?” (2006) 9 Journal of 
International Economic Law 575, 582-586. 
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died.  (Having previously all been impressively creative without the benefit 
of copyright.)  Anyway, on World Book Day UNESCO highlighted “the 
importance of the fight against piracy to preserve creativity”. 
 
• This would not matter in the least, but for the fact that the operation of the 
international copyright system has the capacity to have a negative impact 
on cultural diversity. 
 
 
• The threat that the international copyright system poses to cultural 
diversity and self-determination is a consequence of the process by which it 
commodifies and instrumentalises the cultural outputs with which it is 
concerned.
4
 
 
• Viewed in isolation from the market conditions that characterise the 
cultural industries, copyright’s commodification of cultural output might 
appear, not only benign, but justified by both the need for creators to be 
remunerated in order to encourage them to create
5
 and, in particular, the 
need for cultural works to be disseminated in order to reap the social 
                                                          
4
 For an account of the overlaps between the concepts of culture with which the UNESCO Convention is concerned, 
and the subject matter of copyright law, see F Macmillan, “Copyright, the World Trade Organization, and Cultural 
Self-Determination”, in F Macmillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright: Vol 6 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) 304. 
5
 See, however, R Towse, Creativity, Incentive and Reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and Culture in the 
Information Age (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), esp chs.6 & 8, in which it is argued that copyright generates 
little income for most creative artists.  Nevertheless, Towse suggests that copyright is valuable to creative artists 
for reasons of status and control of their work. 
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benefits of their creation.
6
  However, viewed in context the picture is 
somewhat different. 
 
• This is because copyright law has contributed to, augmented, or created a 
range of market features that have resulted in a high degree of global 
concentration in the ownership of valuable intellectual property in cultural 
goods and services. 
 
• So far as cultural diversity and self-determination are concerned, the 
consequences of this copyright facilitated aggregation of private power 
over cultural goods and services on the global level are not happy ones: 
o Through their control of markets for cultural products the multimedia 
corporations have acquired the power to act as a cultural filter, 
controlling to some extent what we can see, hear and read.
7
   
o Closely associated with this is the tendency towards homogeneity in the 
character of available cultural products and services.
8
  [This tendency, 
and the commercial context in which it occurs, has been well summed 
up by the comment that a large proportion of the recorded music 
offered for retail sale has “about as much cultural diversity as a 
                                                          
6
 For arguments about the importance of copyright in securing communication of works, see N W Netanel, 
“Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 283; &, W van Caenegem, “Copyright, 
Communication & New Technologies” (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 322. 
7
 See further: F Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate Dominance”, in B 
Andersen (ed), Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation, Governance and the Institutional Environment 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) 46; and, in relation to the film industry, see F Macmillan, , “The Cruel ©: 
Copyright and Film” [2002] European Intellectual Property Review 483, 488-489.  See also: A Capling, “Gimme 
shelter!”, Arena Magazine, (February/March, 1996) 21; R L Abel, Speech and Respect (London: Stevens and 
Son/Sweet and Maxwell, 1994), 52; R L Abel, “Public Freedom, Private Constraint” (1994) 21 Journal of Law and 
Society 374, esp 380. 
8
 See also R Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1996). 
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Macdonald’s menu”.
9
  It makes good commercial sense in a globalized 
world to train taste along certain reliable routes, and the market for 
cultural goods and services is no different in this respect to any other.
10
  
Of course, there is a vast market for cultural goods and services and, as 
a consequence, the volume of production is immense.  However, it 
would obviously be a serious mistake to confuse volume with diversity.] 
 
• The vast corporate control over cultural goods and services also has a 
constricting effect on what has been described as the intellectual commons 
or the intellectual public domain.
11
  The impact on the intellectual 
commons manifests itself in various ways.
12
 
 
• For example, private control over a wide range of cultural goods and 
services has an adverse impact on freedom of speech. 
 
• The ability to control speech, arguably objectionable in its own right,
13
 
facilitates a form of cultural domination by private interests.  This may, for 
                                                          
9
 Capling, n 7 supra, 22. 
10
 See T Levitt, “The Globalisation of Markets” (1983) 61 Harvard Business Review 92.  Cf J Gray, False Dawn: The 
Delusions of Global Capitalism (New York, New Press, 1998), 57-58.  However, Gray’s view seems to be that 
diversity stimulates globalization, which must be distinguished from the idea that globalization might stimulate 
diversity. 
11
 This is a concept that has become, unsurprisingly, a central concern of intellectual property scholarship: see, eg, 
C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds), Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2007). 
12
 See further Macmillan, “The Cruel ©”, n 7 supra; Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of 
Corporate Dominance”, n 7 supra; and F Macmillan, “Commodification and Cultural Ownership” in J Griffiths & U 
Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 35. 
13
 See, eg, the discussion of the justifications for the free speech principle in E Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2005). 
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example, take the subtle form of control exercised over the way we 
construct images of our society and ourselves.
14
  But this subtle form of 
control is reinforced by the industry’s overt and aggressive assertion of 
control over the use of material assumed by most people to be in the 
intellectual commons and, thus, in the public domain.  The irony is that the 
reason people assume such material to be in the commons is that the 
copyright owners have force-fed it to us as receivers of the mass culture 
disseminated by the mass media.  The more powerful the copyright owner 
the more dominant the cultural image, but the more likely that the 
copyright owner will seek to protect the cultural power of the image 
through copyright enforcement.  The result is that not only are individuals 
not able to use, develop or reflect upon dominant cultural images, they are 
also unable to challenge them by subverting them.
15
  Coombe describes this 
corporate control of the commons as monological and, accordingly, 
destroying the dialogical relationship between the individual and society.
16
 
 
• These constrictions of the intellectual public domain affect its vibrancy and 
creative potential.  
 
                                                          
14
 See further, eg, R Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 
1998),100-129, which demonstrates how even the creation of alternative identities on the basis of class, sexuality, 
gender and race is constrained & homogenised through the celebrity or star system. 
15
 See, eg, Walt Disney Prods v Air Pirates, 581 F 2d 751 (9
th
 Cir, 1978), cert denied, 439 US 1132 (1979).  On this 
case, see J Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property” (1993) 
69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841; & Macmillan, “Public Interest & the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate 
Dominance”, n 7 supra.  See also M Chon, “Postmodern ‘Progress’: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power” 
(1993) 43 DePaul Law Review 97; D M Koenig “Joe Camel and the First Amendment: The Dark Side of Copyrighted 
and Trademark-Protected Icons” (1994) 11 Thomas M Cooley Law Review 803; & F Macmillan, “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Copyright and Free Speech” in E Barendt (ed), Yearbook of Media Law and Entertainment Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 199. 
16
 Coombe, n 14 supra, 86. 
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• They also tend to undermine the utilitarian/development justification for 
copyright, which is increasingly seen as the dominant justification for 
copyright protection, especially in jurisdictions reflecting the Anglo-
American bias on these matters.  As is well-known, the general idea 
underlying this justification is that the grant of copyright encourages 
investment in the production and dissemination of cultural works, which is 
essential to the development process.
17
 
 
• However, the consequences of copyright’s commodification of cultural 
goods and services, as described above, seem to place some strain on this 
alleged relationship between copyright and development.  Particularly 
where development is thought of in UNESCO’s terms as involving “access to 
the world’s stock of knowledge, … access to power, the right to participate 
in the cultural life of the community”. 
 
 
• None of these problems have been alleviated by the fact that the 
international copyright system has been embedded in the World Trade 
Organization as a result of its Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement).
18
  In fact, there are good reasons for 
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 For a good example of a statement of this rationale, see the Preface to World Intellectual Property Organization, 
Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, (Geneva: WIPO, 1978).  For 
discussion of this rationale, see, eg, J Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights & Social Values in 
Intellectual Property” (1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841, 850ff; & F Macmillan, “Legal Policy and the Limits of 
Literary Copyright” in P Parrinder, W Chernaik and W Gould (eds) Textual Monopolies: Literary Copyright and the 
Public Domain (London: Arts and Humanities Press, 1997), 113. 
18
 TRIPs Agreement, Art 9.1, incorporates Berne Convention, Arts 1-21, except Article 6bis (moral rights) by 
reference.  TRIPs Agreement, Arts 10-14 add some further obligations.  In particular, Arts 11 and 14.4 broaden the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder by the addition of rental rights in relation to computer programmes, films 
and phonograms.  However, neither of these provisions are unique in international copyright law: see WIPO 
Copyright Treaty 1996, Art 7; and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996, Arts 9 & 13. 
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thinking that the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO agreements more 
generally have exacerbated these problems.
19
 
 
• Suffice it to say at this point that in the context of a discussion of 
international instruments affecting the protection of cultural rights, the 
important thing about the WTO agreements, including the TRIPs 
Agreement, is not just that they have the capacity to adversely affect some 
cultural rights, but also that they famously contain no general “cultural 
exception”.  This means that there is almost no space in the WTO system 
for a consideration of cultural interests or rights.
20
  The question of the 
cultural exception in the WTO was, however, long debated
21
 and it can 
hardly be a surprise that those countries who lost this debate strongly 
supported the conclusion of the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
 
 
 
Cultural rights and intellectual property rights? 
 
• This brings us back to the question of the relationship between cultural 
property and intellectual property.  There has been a remarkable 
persistence in claims to connect cultural rights and intellectual property 
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 For a fuller version of this argument see Macmillan, “Copyright, the World Trade Organization, and Cultural Self-
Determination”, n 4 supra. 
20
 For a fuller version of this argument, see Macmillan, “Copyright, the World Trade Organization and Cultural Self-
Determination”, n 4 supra. 
21
 For an account of the history of the debate in the WTO over the absence of a cultural exception, see M Hahn, “A 
Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law” (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 515; & Graber, n 2 supra, 554-555. 
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rights.  This is despite the fact that the system of intellectual property rights 
is in conflict with many of the rights that might be described as cultural 
rights. 
 
• On the other hand, what is common to intellectual property and cultural 
property is that both make an appeal to the preservation or reservation of 
property rights in cultural artefacts in some form.  In order to demonstrate 
this claim, I am using the concept of cultural property broadly to include 
both tangible and intangible cultural property. 
 
• Legally speaking, claims to cultural property are generally claims by a state 
or by a community (somehow defined) to certain property rights.  Where 
international law recognises these rights as belonging to community then it 
often identifies that community as global, or as humanity in general.  
Nevertheless, as is the nature of international law, these global rights and 
rights of humanity are to be enforced through the agency of states.  The 
protection of world heritage sites under the World Heritage Convention is 
an example of this.  In this case, the type of property right asserted is 
generally a right of preservation and sometimes a right of access. 
 
• National laws often make similar claims to artefacts falling within the 
general rubric of “heritage”.  In these cases a wide range of rights are 
asserted, from full state ownership, through rights of preservation 
exercised by the state, to rights vested in the state to control physical 
movement of artefacts.  The last is often particularly important in state 
regimes relating to tangible cultural property.  States may, for example, 
13 
 
attempt to prevent certain artefacts leaving their territories on the ground 
of their significance as “heritage”.
22
 
 
• Obviously, some of these types of rights do not map onto intangible 
cultural property.  Nevertheless, whether cultural property is tangible or 
intangible the essential features of cultural property are:  
• first, that it is “owned” publicly or, at least, in common;  
• secondly, that the ownership rights focus on preservation, access and 
the sharing of benefits associated with it; and  
• thirdly, that the role of cultural property rights are to prevent or limit 
the privatisation of cultural property. 
 
• Claims to intellectual property are, of course, quite different since they 
focus on a private property right.  Further, unlike cultural property, they 
are never claims to tangible property, but rather claims to intangible 
rights (albeit claims that often implicate tangible objects).
23
 
 
• In general this means that although there maybe tangible objects that 
simultaneously attract claims for intellectual property rights and cultural 
property rights, in the tangible realm we are rarely in danger of 
confusing or eliding the two types of property claims. 
 
                                                          
22
 One of the few species of cultural rights recognised by WTO law: see WTO General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), Art XX(f), which provides an exception for measures “imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”. 
23
 In fact the relationship between intellectual property and tangible objects is often problematic.  The most 
obvious example of this relates to the intellectual property protection of works of visual art: see F Macmillan, “Is 
Copyright Blind to the Visual?” (2008) 7 Visual Communication 1. 
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• Things are otherwise, however, in the realm of intellectual or intangible 
space.  Here, the dangers of confusing, eliding and overlapping cultural 
rights and intellectual property rights are considerable. 
 
• In the imaginations of intellectual property scholars, intellectual or 
intangible space tends to consist of two parts, the public domain and the 
private domain.   
 
• Much has been made of the intellectual public domain.  It has been 
reified, and then valorized, as the place where community and culture 
are protected from “property”, meaning privately owned property, and 
where creativity consequently flourishes.  Thus the relationship 
between the intellectual public domain and the intellectual private 
domain looks something like the relationship between raw materials 
and manufactured products. 
 
• Since, at least theoretically, cultural property is publicly owned, it would 
seem to fall within the intellectual public domain. 
 
• It is at this point that we start to run up against the limitations of some 
of the metaphors that are commonly used to contrast the private and 
public intellectual domains.  If we were to apply these metaphors it 
would suggest that the division between cultural property (in the public 
domain) and intellectual property (in the private domain) in the 
intangible domain resembles in some way the divisions between 
knowledge and innovation, idea and expression, and (most perplexingly) 
nature and culture. 
15 
 
 
• In any case, whatever the limitations of the metaphors, the main role of 
cultural property rights in the intellectual domain must surely be to 
protect the public domain from the encroachments of the private 
domain, not to mimic those encroachments. 
 
 
This would all sound beautifully convincing were it not for two issues: 
• The first is the claim to some sort of hybrid space in the intellectual domain 
in which cultural property, owned on a communal basis, is protected 
through a property device that mimics, or is, private intellectual property.  
This is, of course, the basis for the claim of the protection of traditional 
cultural expressions and knowledge through intellectual property-like 
devices.  These claims, being claims by a community forming less than the 
public as a whole, to cultural property in the form of intellectual property, 
strike right at the heart of the hidden or obscured relationship between 
intellectual property and cultural property.  They are founded on the 
assertion that this cultural property can only be preserved through its 
transformation into private property. 
 
• An examination of these claims casts some light on the second outstanding 
issue, which is the more general question of the appropriate role of cultural 
property rights in preserving and maintaining cultural property in the 
intangible realm. 
 
 
 
Returning to the question of copyright and arts festivals 
• So how does all this relate to the question of copyright and arts festivals? 
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• At some very general level much of the rhetoric associated with arts 
festivals seems reminiscent of the rhetorical tropes of copyright law 
(creativity, creative arts, development) and indeed, looking more broadly at 
copyright in the context of intellectual property as a whole the history of 
intellectual property law is closely tied to the idea of a festival since one of 
the generative moments of the Paris Convention was the Great Exhibition 
of 1851 and those that followed in its wake. 
• The Great Exhibitions were also a pivotal moment in the historical 
development of notions of national and international cultural heritage.  
And, returning to the general level, an association exists between the 
rhetorical tropes of cultural rights and cultural heritage rights (human 
creativity, common heritage of humankind, cultural diversity) and those 
relating to present day arts festivals. 
• Of course, one of the challenges when one tries to descend from the 
general to the specific is that exactly how one fits arts festivals into this 
picture depends very much on the type of arts festival in question. 
• This is why, for the purposes of this project, it is necessary to elaborate a 
taxonomy of festivals.  At this stage, and before being informed by the 
conduct of case studies, it seems to me that the following factors should be 
taken into account: 
o Whether the festival is privately or publicly funded; 
o Whether the festival is aimed at a “professional” audience or at the 
general public; 
o Whether the primary purpose of the festival is the marketing of 
discrete cultural products (for example, books, films, music) or is the 
generation or development of creative interactions; 
o Whether it is connected with a particular country or region and 
whether the connection is a necessary/fundamental or 
incidental/instrumental one.  (A necessary connection might, for 
example, be something like Festival dei Misteri, in the Veneto, which 
17 
 
is a festival of, in the words of its Director, “gli spettacoli dedicati ai 
misteri e alle leggende del Veneto nelle piazze, nei borghi, nelle città 
d'arte o immersi nella splendida natura della regione, dai boschi 
montani alle acque della laguna”.  A more instrumental one might be 
represented by the report in Il Venerdì di Repubblica, 27 novembre 
2009, that “Como, ridotta all’ultimo cinema, vuole un festival” in the 
hope of increasing its number of cinemas.) 
 
• For the purposes of this presentation, however, I want to take the example 
of the (probably) publicly funded festival the aim of which is the generation 
or development of creative synergistic reactions; in other words, the 
festival as a creative, performative moment or series of moments. 
• Thinking of a festival in these terms it seems to me that the problems 
raised in terms of the intellectual property/cultural property interface have 
some parallels with those relating to the issue of indigenous cultural 
property. 
• First, there are considerable technical difficulties in stretching or re-shaping 
copyright law to protect the sort of creativity that occurs at festivals.  These 
include:  
o the closed categories of protected copyright works and the 
consequent inability of the copyright system to protect new forms of 
creative works, especially “hybrid” works;  
o the evolution of copyright as a right in relation to text-based works, 
which may have adversely affected its ability to regulate non text-
based forms of cultural production;  
o the failure of the copyright system to recognise so-called ephemeral 
works;  
18 
 
o a relatively inflexible concept of authorship, in particular a concept 
that (we know from the indigenous context) does not easily embrace 
notions of group authorship;  
o limited and uncertain legal spaces for using or appropriating material 
from other copyright protected works; 
o the emphasis of the copyright system on the rights of disseminators 
of cultural works at the arguable expense of the creators of those 
works. 
• Secondly, the types of creativity that might occur in the context of an arts 
festival of the sort I am describing possibly require a kind of defensive use 
of intellectual property rights in the sense that the festival as a 
performative moment requires a certain degree of liberty and freedom 
inside a certain group (ie freedom without the constraints of intellectual 
property), but at the same time this creative freedom will only be freely 
expressed if there is some protection from unlawful appropriation of 
creativity from outside the group. 
• Thirdly, I wonder whether it is appropriate to allow copyright to constitute 
what is intended to be an innovative moment of creativity.  In relation to 
indigenous cultural property, one of the most important criticisms that can 
be made of the idea that it should be protected by intellectual property 
rights is that it has to be corralled into the shape of Western intellectual 
property law.
24
  If the item of cultural property is a story, music, or artwork 
then it has to be fitted into copyright law; designs and symbols must fit into 
the netherworld of the relationship between copyright, designs and trade 
marks; knowledge about local flora and fauna must be fitted somewhere 
into patent law, plants breeder’s rights, geographical indications.  This will 
mean that different levels of protection will apply to different types of 
traditional knowledge and culture.  In short, the end result is that 
occidental intellectual property law comes to constitute traditional, or non-
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 See M Blakeney, “The Protection of Traditional Knowledge Under Intellectual Property Law” (2000) 22 European 
Intellectual Property Law Review 251. 
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Western, culture and heritage.
25
  In so doing, it changes the shape of that 
heritage its in ways that are not necessarily the consequence of the 
reflexive cultural practice that in fact constitutes so-called traditional 
cultural expressions and knowledge.  Although lacking the post-colonial 
context, I wonder whether stale old copyright law, and perhaps also designs 
law, are up to the task of constituting inherently innovative cultural 
practices. 
 
 
Some Tentative Questions and Even More Tentative Answers 
• Can we think of, at least some types, of festivals as a species of cultural 
space and the synergistic exchanges within that space as a type of cultural 
property? 
• Do we leave cultural property in the intellectual public domain where it can 
be freely mined as raw material for intellectual property, but where it 
might not be adequately conserved or preserved as cultural property?  
• Or, do we privatise it through intellectual property rights and run the risk of 
destroying its distinctive character as cultural property and heritage? 
 
• These questions are, of course, part of a much larger problem about the 
preservation and conservation of intangible cultural property in the 
intellectual domain. 
 
• It almost goes without saying that, in intellectual space, the problem of the 
relationship between cultural property and intellectual property is 
unresolved by law.  Consequently, the question of preserving or conserving 
cultural property in intellectual space remains inadequately addressed.   
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• The suggestion that the best method of preservation and conservation of 
intangible cultural property is by its privatisation in the form of intellectual 
property does, however, seem naive.  Not only is intellectual property ill-
equipped to protect cultural rights, it is clearly implicated in the 
constriction and possible destruction of some cultural rights. 
 
 
 
 
• We need to solve this problem by a much more complex articulation of the 
intellectual or intangible domain.  Specifically, I think we need to start 
moving away from the simplified binary divide of the intellectual public 
domain and the intellectual private domain of intellectual property law.  Or, 
at least, away from the notion that the intellectual public domain is some 
undifferentiated concept equating to the “commons” in Roman law.
26
  Let 
us start, instead, to give some much more complex legal architecture to the 
public domain of intellectual space.  A blueprint for a such architecture 
might include: 
• a notion of the difference between what is publicly owned in 
intellectual space and what is in the commons – that is, unowned –in 
intellectual space and thus ripe for appropriation; 
• an associated recognition that some things can never be owned, at 
least privately, because of their cultural significance; 
• development of the concept of group and communal rights, 
belonging to less than the public as a whole, bounded by property on 
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the outside, but inside promoting freedom and space for creativity, 
innovation, invention, and cultural conservation.
27
 
 
Failure to develop the same complex architecture in intellectual or intangible 
space as that which we have developed in tangible space for the preservation of 
heritage and cultural property, only invites constant encroachment by the type of 
private propertization in intellectual space that undermines and destroys claims 
to cultural property in that space.  The power of intellectual property rights in the 
context of the ascendant system of WTO law makes this an urgent political and 
legal project. 
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